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Abstract: It is increasingly acknowledged that gender (in-) equality is one of the 
most signifi cant factors underlying change in fertility behavior. Researchers have 
extensively studied the link between gender (in-) equality and fertility decision-
making in various settings. However, most of these studies have focused on 
industrialized countries in North America, Europe, and East Asia, while very few 
examine this relationship in a non-western, developing country context. Employing 
individual-level survey data, this paper examines the relationship between parents’ 
gender role attitudes and their fertility intentions for an additional child in urban 
Turkey, surveyed in 2014. The fi ndings of this study show that parents’ attitudes 
toward gender roles were not an important predictor of fertility decision-making 
in Turkey. This study suggests that the lack of signifi cant fi ndings supporting the 
expected association may be related to the measurement of gender role attitudes, 
suggesting a need to construct a measure that addresses culture-specifi c aspects 
of gender roles. This study contributes to the literature by providing a new data 
point, Turkey, and bringing a comparative perspective to the existing research.
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1 Introduction 
Fertility rates have fallen dramatically over recent decades in many countries 
across the world. For example, the phenomenon of “lowest-low fertility levels” has 
surfaced in Central and Eastern European countries (Kohler et al. 2002), and East 
Asia has also become a region marked by low fertility. Moreover, examples of non-
western low-fertility patterns can be extended to the Middle East. Countries in this 
region of the world are at different stages of a transition from high to low fertility, 
with total fertility rates hovering around replacement level, such as in Lebanon and 
Tunisia (Assaad/Roudi-Fahimi 2007).
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Many theories have been offered to explain low fertility, including increasing 
individual autonomy and increasing age at fi rst marriage (e.g., Caldwell/Schindlmayr 
2003); postponement of childbearing due to economic uncertainty, and the 
opportunity costs of childbearing (e.g., Kohler et al. 2002). Recent research has 
drawn increasing attention to the relationship between gender equality and fertility 
behavior. McDonald’s (2000a/b) gender equity theory in particular postulates that 
the decline in fertility is largely related to the inconsistency between increased 
gender equality in institutions of education and labor markets on the one hand 
and relatively low levels of gender equity in family and family-related settings 
on the other. Building on the gender equity framework, gender revolution theory 
has suggested that gender egalitarianism in both the public and private spheres 
will increase fertility in low-fertility countries. In particular, as men increasingly 
participate in domestic chores and childcare, and thus share the burden of work and 
family life, women will be willing to have more children (Goldscheider et al. 2015). 
An extensive literature has studied the association between gender equality and 
fertility behavior in various settings, reporting mixed fi ndings (e.g., Arpino et al. 
2015; Brinton/Lee 2016; Miettinen et al. 2011; Mills et al. 2008; Oláh 2003; Puur et 
al. 2008; Torr/Short 2004). The previous literature exploring this association has 
focused largely on the European context, though there is also an emerging literature 
on non-western settings, most of which focuses on low-fertility countries in East 
Asia (e.g., Brinton et al. 2018; Freeman et al. 2018; Kan/Hertog 2017; Yang 2017). 
There is a gap in the literature with regard to examining the gender equality-fertility 
relationship in more diverse settings with “nation-specifi c contextual explanations” 
(Mills et al. 2008). This study builds on the previous literature and expands the 
research on the gender equality-fertility relationship by examining Turkey; a new 
socio-cultural setting and understudied context. 
This study provides an empirical analysis of the association between gender 
(in-) equality and low fertility in Turkey, a Muslim country with persistent yet highly 
variable gender equality problems. While there have been many political reforms 
since the founding of the republic to change women’s societal circumstances, when 
it comes to public attitudes on gender roles, Turkey represents a quintessential 
example of “the stalled revolution.” The country has had idiosyncratic gender 
relationships and declining fertility for the past several decades. Fertility rates are 
currently below replacement level, with the western parts of the country already 
having experienced below-replacement fertility for the past decade. The persistent 
fertility decline has sparked considerable concern among politicians and the public, 
leading the current government to expend considerable efforts on encouraging 
higher fertility (Kavas 2019). This study focuses on fertility intention, which is an 
important motivational antecedent of the fertility-related behaviors of individuals 
(Miller 2011: 76). This study contributes to this literature by testing the gender 
equality-fertility relationship in an understudied socio-cultural setting, offering a 
comparative perspective. 
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2 Background
There has been growing interest in the gender ideology-fertility relationship 
since Becker’s (1985) “new home economics” paradigm, which pointed to a 
strong interaction between women’s increasing labor force participation coupled 
with changes in the sexual division of labor and declining fertility. More recently, 
McDonald (2000a/b) has provided an explanation of the link between unequal 
gender norms and fertility outcomes. In oft-cited works, McDonald suggests that 
the decline in fertility to replacement level is linked to an improvement of equity in 
the family sphere, where women have achieved the right to control their parenthood 
decisions. However, further declines in fertility below replacement levels is related 
to the imbalance between high gender equity in institutional settings and the lack of 
a corresponding increase of equality in family settings, with the result that women 
respond to the disproportionate burden of the “double shift” by limiting their 
fertility. McDonald’s theory (2006) sheds some light on the issue of desired/ideal 
fertility versus completed fertility, arguing that due to the unintended consequences 
of changing social and economic institutions, individuals may not be able to achieve 
their ideal fertility. Forgoing their ideal family size, women in particular state that “in 
a different institutional setting, they believe they would have had more children” 
(McDonald 2006: 485).
2.1 Previous works
Gender equity theory has increasingly attracted demographers’ attention, with 
numerous studies testing this theory using either a macro- or micro-level empirical 
approach. In general, studies have used survey data to investigate the association 
between gender equality and fertility outcomes. These approaches either focus 
on the household division of labor or on people’s gender role attitudes, and have 
reported mixed fi ndings (e.g., Arpino et al. 2015; Brinton/Lee 2016; Cooke 2009; 
Miettinen et al. 2011; Mills et al. 2008; Mills 2010; Oláh 2003; Puur et al. 2008; 
Torr/Short 2004; Westoff/Higgins 2009). Of special interest to demographers in 
this tradition has been the variation in the impact of gender equality on fertility 
by gender. For example, using the Population Policy Acceptance Study for eight 
European countries, Puur et al. (2008) explored the impact of men’s role orientations 
on their fertility intentions, fi nding that men with an egalitarian attitude both had 
a higher desire to have children and a higher number of children than men with 
traditional views did. 
For women, egalitarian attitudes may yield higher fertility if it is combined with 
men’s increasing participation in household tasks. Cooke (2009) examined two 
countries, Italy and Spain, analysing the likelihood of having a second child within 
married couple households. The author suggests that when women receive help 
from their partner with household chores and childcare tasks, the likelihood of having 
a second child increases, although this effect was only signifi cant in Italy. Numerous 
other studies have focused on the impact of men’s changing roles in the family, 
both on their fertility aspirations as well as their partners’. Overall, these scholars 
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draw attention to the notion of “fertility recovery,” which indicates that when there 
is equality in the family, with husbands sharing both domestic chores and childcare, 
partner relationships become more fulfi lling and consequently partners have an 
increased desire to continue childbearing (Brinton et al. 2018; Freeman et al. 2018; 
Goldscheider et al. 2015; Kan/Hertog 2017; Oláh 2003). 
While ample evidence suggests a positive correlation between egalitarian 
gender role attitudes and fertility rates, other studies have found no signifi cant 
relationship between the two. Chief among these works is Philipov’s study (2008), 
which examined ten European countries and employed three dimensions of gender-
egalitarian attitudes. He found no clear association between the three gender 
dimensions and fertility intentions for the second or higher-order parity. 
Moreover, some of these studies present contrasting fi ndings, despite largely 
using the same data sets and measurement. For example, Puur et al. (2008)’s fi nding 
that egalitarian attitudes among men in eight European countries are positively 
correlated with higher fertility desire and realization was countered by Westoff 
and Higgins’s (2009) recent work, in which the authors designed a similar study 
yet found a diametrically opposed relationship between the egalitarian attitudes of 
men and their actual fertility outcomes. 
2.2 Measuring Gender Equality and Fertility
Empirical studies have provided mixed or confl icting evidence concerning gender 
equality and fertility relationship (e.g., Arpino et al. 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2010; 
Miettinen et al. 2011). The measurement of gender equality seems to be the most 
widely-stated challenge in the literature (Arpino et al. 2015; Brinton/Lee 2016; 
Davis/Greenstein 2009; Goldscheider et al. 2010; Knight/Brinton 2017; Miettinen et 
al. 2011; Puur et al. 2008; Torr/Short 2004; Westoff/Higgins 2009). Some scholars 
suggest that widely-used survey indicators may not be measuring gender equality 
thoroughly (e.g., Brinton/Lee 2016; Knight/Brinton 2017; Mills 2010), while others 
argue that the survey indicators may in effect function as a “surrogate” of the 
concept (Arpino et al. 2015).
Others draw attention to the complexity and multidimensionality of gender 
equality, noting that commonplace approaches of classifying gender role attitudes 
as a linear continuum from traditionalism to egalitarianism may not adequately 
depict the historical trajectory of change or the cross-cultural distinctions in gender 
norms (Knight/Brinton 2017; Brinton/Lee 2016). As Hudde (2018) argues, there is 
no reason to construct gender ideologies as binary concepts of either traditional 
or egalitarian while societies adopt various gender relations ranging from gender-
symmetric models to alternative forms such as “the one-and-a-half earner model” 
or “the returning to the more traditional norms of gender roles”. In line with this, in 
a study, Grunow et al. (2018) constructed fi ve gender ideology profi les and found 
multidimensional gender ideologies to be more prevalent among the respondents 
than unidimensional constructs. The authors also found that egalitarian ideologies, 
which refl ect joint spheres of earning and caring, intensive parenting and egalitarian 
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essentialism were more prevalent in all the European countries examined in this 
study.
Measuring gender equality by attending to cross-cultural variations is crucial in 
that it helps us better understand distinctions in gender-role attitudes. For one, not 
all countries have the same gender systems; no matter how close geographically or 
culturally they are to each other, their norms and practices may still be highly variable 
(Goldscheider et al. 2010; Mills et al. 2008). Much evidence exists regarding the 
varying nature of gender equality across societies, including its differential effects 
on fertility behavior (Arpino et al. 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015; Knight/Brinton 
2017; Mills 2010; Mills et al. 2008). For example, using data from two countries with 
very low fertility (Japan and Spain) and two countries with slightly higher fertility (the 
United States and Sweden), Brinton et al. (2018) investigated how gender inequality 
may generate a gap between women’s fertility ideals (hypothetical aspirations) and 
intentions (realistic aspirations) in all four countries. They found that while American 
and Swedish female interviewees were more likely than those in Japan and Spain 
to mention unequal gender roles as a reason for their fertility ideals and intentions 
gap, gender inequality was more signifi cantly associated with low fertility intentions 
among highly educated interviewees in Japan and Spain. 
Studies operationalize fertility outcomes differently. While most research focuses 
on continued childbearing for different parities (e.g., Cooke 2009; Miettinen et al. 
2011; Torr/Short 2004), a large body of literature also examines fertility intentions 
(e.g., Brinton et al. 2018; Kan/Hertog 2017; Mills et al. 2008; Mills 2010; Okun/Raz-
Yurovich 2019; Tazi-Preve et al. 2004; Yang 2017). Brinton et al. (2018) draw a fi ne 
line between fertility ideals and intentions. The authors describe fertility ideals 
as more hypothetical aspirations without consideration of one’s specifi c family 
situation, whereas intentions are more realistic plans that include the constraints 
that individuals perceive in reaching their ideals. Thus, “fertility intentions lie in-
between family size ideals and completed fertility” (Brinton et al. 2018: 281).
2.3 Gender roles and family life in Turkey
Family relationships and demographic patterns are key areas that clearly display the 
continuity and change that characterize social life in Turkey. Since the founding of 
the republic in 1923, Turkey has undergone an intensive modernization experience, 
which persists to date with Turkey’s ongoing bid to join European Union. The state-
led modernization project led to many changes in demographic and family behaviors, 
including increases in the age at fi rst marriage, divorce rates, declines in fertility, more 
egalitarian gender roles, and more independence among young people. Regarding 
women’s status, in particular, republican reformers staunchly supported improving 
women’s circumstances through increasing education, employment, and political 
participation. After the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
successive governments maintained his legacy by implementing this modernization/
secularization agenda, which included policy actions aiming to reduce gender 
inequalities (Aksoy/Billari 2018). Legal reforms in particular continued in line with 
Turkey’s efforts to align with European Union standards. Substantial amendments 
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were made to the civil code in 2003, bringing about signifi cant changes with respect 
to gender equality. For example, the amended civil code increased the legal age 
of marriage to 18 for both sexes, which had previously been 17 for men and 15 for 
women. It also introduced the legal basis for the sharing of marital assets in case of 
divorce, and adopted the legal measures to ensure equal status of wife and husband 
in the family (Ilkkaracan 2007). 
Importantly, reforms related to gender roles and family life faced severe opposition 
from conservative circles and despite all legal changes and reforms, traditional and 
authoritarian family practices remain widespread in the country (Cindoğlu et al. 
2008), making hybridity an important feature of family life in Turkey (Kavas/Thornton 
2013). Moreover, the current conservative government’s efforts to “protect and 
strengthen families” contributed to this hybridity (Yılmaz 2015; Kaya 2015; Yazıcı 
2012; also see Aksoy/Billari 2018). For almost two decades, conservative discourse 
and political debates about the need to increase fertility, eliminate abortion and 
family planning, and traditional norms about women’s roles in the family featured 
prominently current government’s policy agenda.
In Turkey, marriage and having children are important pillars of family formation, 
and couples without a child do not fi t into the mainstream defi nition of “family” 
broadly accepted by the population. Turkish family norms equally denounce being 
unmarried and being married and childless, and thus voluntary childlessness is 
almost non-existent in Turkey (HUIPS 2014). 
The notion of a strong family bond, interdependence among family members, 
and a strong generational hierarchy are deeply entrenched, positively valued, and 
remain highly prevalent in Turkish society (Sunar/Fisek 2005). Turkish parents are 
generally protective of and expect obedience and dependence from their children 
(Kağıtçıbaşı 1982), and stay continuously involved in adult children’s decision-making 
concerning important family issues (Nauck/Klaus 2008). Parent-child relationships, 
particularly in urban middle-class Turkish families, are characterized by emotional 
closeness and relatedness, especially between mothers and daughters (Ataca/
Sunar 1999). 
In Turkey, young women are socialized into normative gender roles according to 
which women are expected to be embedded into a family setting through marriage 
and childbearing and play the roles of mothers and wives, while husbands are 
the head of the family. In fact, before the 2003 civil code reforms, the traditional 
gender roles classifying men as breadwinners and heads of families and women 
as homemakers were even legally supported (Ilkkaracan 2012). Marriage is almost 
universal, and although the minimum legal age at which marriage can take place is 
18, young people can get married at the age of 17 with parental consent, and at the 
age 16 with the approval of a judge.
With respect to gender roles, social class and urban-rural variations matter. 
Therefore, given the institutional changes over the decades and the great variability 
and heterogeneity of women’s status, it would be a mistake to consider women in 
Turkey as passive victims of patriarchal norms and social rules (Kağıtçıbaşı 1986; 
Cindoğlu et al. 2008). For example, educated and high-income women tend to have 
more liberal attitudes toward gender roles, tend to be more resistant to patriarchal 
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norms, and more willing to embrace changing social norms. Moreover, studies 
reveal that there are changes in attitudes to gender roles, particularly in the urban, 
middle-class, and professional population of Turkey (e.g. Aycan 2004; Aycan/Eskin 
2005). A study reports that a higher number of men than before share domestic 
responsibilities in Turkey (Aycan 2004).
2.4 Statement of the problem and research questions
This study aims to shed light on the gender ideology-fertility relationship in Turkey. 
It uses the gender-equity framework, which suggests that the imbalance between 
the higher gender equity in the public sphere and lower improvements of equality in 
family life leads to fertility decline, with women responding to the disproportionate 
burden of domestic works by limiting their fertility (McDonald 2006).
The persistent fertility decline since the 1950s is the central theme in Turkish 
demographic discourse (Yavuz 2006). The total fertility rate (TFR) fell from a high of 7.1 
children per woman in 1930 to 4.3 in 1978, 3.1 during the late 1980s, 2.1 in 2009, and 
most recently below replacement level, at 1.88 in 2019 (Turkish Statistical Institute 
(TurkStat) 2020). According to the Demographic and Health Survey (2008), western 
regions of the country have already been experiencing below-replacement fertility 
for many years, with a TFR of 1.7 in 2008. The reasons for the decline in TFR over the 
years are generally explained with the socio-economic development the country 
has experienced for the past several decades and the changing status of women, 
especially regarding education (Akadlı-Ergöçmen 1997; D’Addato et al. 2007; Yavuz 
2006; Koç et al. 2014). For example, Akadlı-Ergöçmen (1997) highlighted a strong 
relationship between women’s status and fertility decline. Using demographic and 
health survey data, she found that women with fi ve or more years of education, a job 
with social security, and a say in their marriage arrangement, as well as increased 
age at fi rst marriage, tend to have fewer children. Moreover, a recent study found 
a connection between gender inequality and fertility outcomes in Turkey (Kavas 2019). 
Using in-depth interviews with mothers, Kavas (2019) found that women’s shouldering 
larger shares of housework and childcare seemed to be an important reason for 
decreasing fertility in Turkey. In yet another study, the division of housework was 
found to be a signifi cant indicator of women’s fertility intentions in Turkey; using 
demographic and health survey data Berktaş (2016) found that when having a higher 
share of housework responsibilities, women in the 25-34 age group had a lower 
desire for more children.
Therefore, given its persistent fertility decline over the years and women’s status 
that is replete with ambivalence and paradoxes, Turkey seems to be a relevant place 
to study the relationship between gender equity and fertility. Moreover, since much 
of the literature on gender equality and fertility focuses on industrialized countries 
in the West, where more egalitarian gender roles characterize social life, it would 
be interesting to explore this relationship in a non-western developing country 
context where there is great variability concerning gender roles, with considerable 
continuity and change.
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Toward this end, the fi rst research question of this study is whether there is an 
association between parents’ gender role attitudes and their fertility intentions for 
an additional child in Turkey. In particular, the study aims to explore the role that 
gender egalitarianism plays in fertility decline.
As discussed, this study argues that despite the efforts made since the founding 
of the republic to improve women’s status in society, gender inequality persists, 
most palpably in the family sphere. With respect to access to education, girls’ 
primary schooling is universal, and secondary and tertiary net enrolment rates were 
66 and 32 percent respectively in 2011 (World Bank, gender equality report, 2012). 
However, when it comes to the provision of social policy measures to facilitate work-
family balance, Turkey cannot claim to have a particularly supportive labor market 
environment (Ilkkaracan 2012). Housework and childcare are largely women’s 
responsibilities, with the most recent nationwide family structure survey reporting 
that 86 percent of mothers are the main childcare providers (TurkStat 2016). In 
this context, parents with egalitarian attitudes may expect a more supportive 
environment with respect to equality in role sharing and public policy and may have 
a lower desire to have children than those with traditional views, who tend to take 
unequal gender roles for granted. 
The second research question asks whether or not the infl uence of gender role 
attitudes on fertility persists once background factors are controlled for. According 
to Kandiyoti (1995), male dominance in Turkey was redefi ned and renegotiated over 
the past decades, with changes depending on geography and socioeconomic status. 
As a result, Turkey has become a country where multiple family gender cultures 
have coexisted. Parents’ levels of education, employment status, ethnicity, etc. may 
play a role in their gender role attitudes. Therefore, it is important to know how 
these structural factors interact with gender norms and infl uence fertility decision-
making.
The third research question concerns the extent to which these structural factors, 
which are known to affect fertility decision-making generally, infl uence fertility 
intentions independently of gender role attitudes in Turkey. 
3 Method
3.1 Data 
The data used in this study are drawn from a larger survey project titled “Fertility, 
Family Life and Developmental Idealism in Urban Turkey”, designed to study views 
about fertility and family life in Turkey, which includes a module on gender ideology. 
Data were collected in 2014 through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected 
men and women of reproductive age (18-49). A multi-stage stratifi ed sampling 
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procedure was employed to attain samples in 17 cities.1 Interviews were held with 
individuals residing in households located in randomly selected neighborhoods, with 
the selected blocks consisting of 20 households. The main rationale for limiting the 
sample to cities was the very high costs of national surveys that include rural areas. 
This means that the results of this study can be extrapolated only to urban Turkey 
and not to the country as a whole. Furthermore, under the assumption that people 
in cities likely have more egalitarian attitudes than those in rural areas, the exclusion 
of the latter would refl ect higher endorsement of egalitarianism in the urban sample 
compared to a national sample. However, it is important to note that with the current 
geographical distribution of the population, Turkey’s urban areas are becoming 
increasingly heterogeneous by including substantial rural communities. In Turkey, a 
massive rural-to-urban migration has characterized the population structure of the 
country since the 1950s. It continued for several decades, increasing the percentage 
of the population that is urban (Erder 2002). In 2012, the proportion of the population 
living in the cities was 77 percent, and currently it is 93 percent (TurkStat 2020). 
So, given this heterogeneous geographical distribution of the population, it may 
be diffi cult to predict how different the urban results would be from results with a 
national sample.
A sample of 2034 individuals from all regions of the country was successfully 
interviewed, yielding a response rate of 51 percent. However, due to the research 
focus of this study, the sample is limited to married parents between the ages of 
18 and 49, reducing the study sample to 1120 respondents. After this restriction, 
an analytical sample of 444 men and 676 women was included in the regression 
analyses, with slightly fewer observations in the multivariate analyses due to 
missing data (Table 4 and 5). Based on the specifi c research questions, the study 
prioritized the inclusion of men and women with at least one child. The reason for 
not including childless married couples is that the transition to parenthood happens 
almost as a matter of course in Turkey. As noted above, lifetime childlessness is 
very rare in Turkey, with family norms denouncing childlessness. Parents are 
infl uential in reproductive decision-making, typically wanting grandchildren and 
exerting pressure on adult children to produce offspring soon after marriage 
(Kavas/De Jong 2020; Nauck/Klaus 2008). Thus, as in many other social settings, in 
Turkey “the normative pressure to become a parent” (Rindfuss et al. 1988) obliges 
married individuals to have a fi rst child early, which obscures other factors that 
should shape fertility decision-making. Thus, in a social environment in which 
couples are expected to have a child quickly, it is diffi cult to disentangle the effects 
of people’s attitudes on gender roles on their fertility decision-making for the fi rst 
birth. However, the transition to second or higher-order births is the stage when the 
cost and benefi t of having additional children are considered more carefully (Olah 
2003), and therefore this life-course transition is more conducive to examining the 
1 The sampled cities from different regions of the country are as follows:
 Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Konya, 
Malatya, Manisa, Samsun, Şanliurfa, Tekirdağ,Trabzon
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infl uence of gender role attitudes on the decision to have a child. Moreover, because 
in Turkey childbearing almost universally takes place within marriage (HUIPS 2014), 
the sample consists entirely of married parents. 
3.2 Measures
The dependent variable, fertility intention, was measured by asking whether or 
not the respondent planned to have (a/another) child sometime in the future, with 
the answers categorized as No = 0 and Yes = 1. Pregnant couples were excluded. 
Gender role attitudes were measured with twelve statements presented below. 
These attitudinal questions on gender ideology evince respondents’ views on 
gendered roles in the spheres of work and family, and have been used in several 
surveys including the World Values Survey, European Values Study (e.g., 1999), 
and other research (e.g., Brinton/Lee 2016; Westoff/Higgins 2009). An exploratory 
factor analysis was performed on these twelve categorical variables (Table 1). The 
analysis of factor loadings and the conceptual overlap between items led to the 
conclusion that there are two main gender ideology clusters, with the items in each 
group loading together signifi cantly. The fi rst gender role attitudes scale (GRA-1) 
was measured with six statements, with Cronbach’s alpha for these items being .61. 
The fi rst three items in the fi rst set of questions seem to address individualism 
in general rather than gender equality in particular, they address a women’s 
independence as a single mother and whether an individual should be able to choose 
to be unmarried and childless. Therefore, they are relevant to women and men living 
in society without fi tting a mainstream defi nition of family life, so I believe they still 
assess some aspects of gender equality (see Westoff/Higgins 2009). The remaining 
items in this scale capture respondents’ gender role attitudes toward husbands’ and 
wives’ work roles, including the importance of a job for a woman’s independence, 
women’s ability to shoulder both family and work commitments, and whether men 
and women should equally contribute to family income.
The second set of questions in the second scale (GRA-2) (all reverse coded) 
focuses more on men’s and women’s roles in family life and contains the following 
items, with a Cronbach’s alpha score of .51. (Table 1). These questions address gender 
roles in family life and stress, for example, women’s “innate” role as caregivers and 
housewives, the necessity of having a child to be fulfi lled, the primacy of parenthood 
over individual choices, and perceptions of women’s desires to stay at home rather 
than work. Also, given the framing of these questions, it seems that these items 
tend to measure traditionalism more directly than egalitarianism, in that agreement 
with any of these statements will refl ect a traditional attitude (Knight/Brinton 2017).
In sum, while questions in the fi rst gender role attitudes scale (GRA-1) include 
items that tap individual choices and gender roles in the public sphere and particularly 
women’s labor force participation, the questions in the second gender role attitudes 
scale (GRA-2) covers attitudes to familial roles and the private sphere. Moreover, the 
fi rst gender role attitudes scale seems to refl ect statements of egalitarianism directly, 
while the second gender role attitudes scale measures gender-egalitarianism 
indirectly by measuring the degree of adherence to traditional norms.
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While the answers of these questions were categorized with a fi ve-point Likert 
scale ranging from (1) “strongly agree” to (5) “strongly disagree,” I recoded the 
variables into three answers: (1) “disagree”, (2) “neither”, and (3) “agree”. For each 
of the gender role attitudes scales, the range of scores goes from a minimum of 
6 (those with the most traditional gender role attitudes) to a maximum 18 (those 
with the most egalitarian views on gender roles). The scales in the second set 
were reversed so that higher scores also indicate more egalitarian attitudes . For 
the analysis, the gender role attitudes measure was divided into three categories: 
traditional, intermediate, and egalitarian using K-mean cluster analysis. For the 
fi rst gender role attitude scale (GRA-1), cluster one represents “traditional” with 
the threshold scores being 6-11, cluster two is labelled “intermediate” with scores 
ranging from 12-14, and cluster three is “egalitarian” with scores from 15-18.
For the second gender role attitude scale (GRA-2), the fi rst cluster is “traditional” 
from 6-9, the second cluster, “intermediate”, ranging from 10-13 and the fi nal cluster, 
“egalitarian”, from 14-18.
Tab. 1: Factor loadings for gender role attitudes items in individualism and 
family oriented categories
Gender role attitude 1, 
Individualism/work orientation
If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent and she does not want to have
a stable relationship with a man, she should be able to have the child. .347
It is OK for a person to decide not to marry. .836
It is OK for a person to decide not to have children. .795
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her
children as a mother who does not work. .598
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person. .421
Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income. .344
Cronbach’s alpha .61
Gender role attitude 2, 
family orientation
A married couple should have at least one child. .383
A person has to have at least one child in order to be fulfi lled. .389
When there are children in the family, parents should stay together even if they do
not get along. .471
Being a housewife is just as fulfi lling as working for pay. .520
A preschool child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works. .611
A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children. .694
Cronbach’s alpha .51
Source: author’s analysis of survey data from “Fertility, Family Life and Developmental 
Idealism in Urban Turkey” (2014)
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Other variables in the model include standard controls such as age, education, 
employment, age at fi rst marriage, having a son, sibling size, number of children, 
ethnicity, and religiosity. The education variable (that of respondents and their 
spouses) was constructed by dividing education in to three categories based on the 
number of years of schooling; 0-8, 9-12, and 13 years and above. Employment status 
was created as a binary variable (0 = does not have a job; 1 = has a job). Age, along 
with age at fi rst marriage, were included in the analyses as interval variables coded 
in years. The number of children is grouped into three categories: one, two, and 
three and more children. Religiousness was measured with a single question asking 
whether or not the respondents think of themselves as a religious person, with the 
answer categories of “no” and “yes” (coded no = 0 and yes = 1.) Two main ethnic 
categories were identifi ed, Turks and non-Turks, with non-Turks representing mainly 
the Kurdish population which constitutes the largest ethnic minority in Turkey. In 
Turkey, fertility patterns vary to a great extent by ethnic identity. In eastern Turkey, 
where Kurdish populations predominate, the TFR is on average 3.41 births per 
woman (HUIPS 2014).
Also included in the model are the number of siblings and a binary variable 
for having a son. The number of siblings is known to correlate with fertility, as 
individuals’ family background, i.e. coming either from a large or small family, 
may infl uence their family size preferences (Miettinen et al. 2011). The number of 
siblings is asked with a question on how many siblings the interviewee had in their 
household while growing up (including themselves; the answers are categorized 
as fewer than 2 siblings = 0; 2 and more siblings = 1). Studies show that there is 
a strong correlation between son preference and fertility intention and behavior. 
For example, parents with a son preference may want to have additional children 
until the desired gender composition is reached (Park/Cho 1995). This variable is 
included in the analyses as a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent has a son. 
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive table of the sample (Table 2), shows that close to half of the mothers 
and slightly more than half the fathers fi t into the egalitarian category. Over one-
third of mothers and one-fourth of fathers are intermediate, while over one-fi fth of 
both female and male parents are traditional. In the second gender role attitudes 
scale, covering family orientation, the traditional category contains the majority 
of respondents. Half of the female parents and more than one-third of the male 
parents fi t into the intermediate category and less than 10 percent are egalitarian.
With regard to the demographic variables, Table 2 shows that the mean age of 
female interviewees was 35.7 and that of male respondents was 37.8, most likely 
because women marry younger than men do. While mothers commonly have 
primary education, fathers have secondary and tertiary education more often than 
mothers do. Regarding spouses’ education, a similar picture can be observed: 
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Female parents’ spouses have a higher share of secondary and tertiary education, 
and male parents’ spouses have a lower level of higher education. In sum, men on 
average have higher education than women, which is consistent with the general 
patterns in Turkey. Almost all of the fathers have a job, as opposed to only one-fi fth 
Tab. 2: Sample characteristics (% or mean)
Female parents Male parents












Age (years) 35.7 37.8
Age at fi rst marriage (years) 20.3 24.2
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of mothers being employed, and this gender gap in employment rates also holds 
true when the mothers’ and their spouses are considered. While around one-fourth 
of parents have one child, over two-fi fths have two children, and slightly over one-
third have three or more children. 
The childbearing patterns of the parents in the study are consistent with the 
country’s fertility trends, where the two-child norm has prevailed for the past 
several decades. Around four-fi fths of both men and women have at least one son. 
An overwhelming majority have more than two children. Almost every third parent 
in the sample is not Turkish, with the non-Turks being predominantly Kurdish since 
Kurdish people are the largest ethnic minority in Turkey, constituting 14 percent 
of the country’s population, (Konda 2011). A vast majority of fathers describe 
themselves as religious and an even higher share of mothers do so.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the distribution of gender role attitudes 
and fertility intentions. The descriptive statistics display no association between 
gender role attitudes and the intention to have a child. In the fi rst gender role 
attitudes scale (individualism/work orientation), intermediate men seem to intend to 
have more children, somewhat more often than traditional and egalitarian men do. 
In the second gender role attitudes scale (family orientation), a slightly higher share 
of egalitarian men intends to have an additional child. Among female parents across 
both gender role attitudes scales, it is somewhat more common that intermediate 
mothers intend to have more children than other mothers.
Tab. 2: Continuation
Female parents Male parents
Sibling
Fewer than 2 14.9 10.4








Not religious 14.6 23.6
Missing 0.6 0.2
Total N 676 444
Source: author’s analysis of survey data from “Fertility, Family Life and Developmental 
Idealism in Urban Turkey” (2014)
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Fig. 1: Basic descriptions of relevant key variables: Intention of having one 

































Source: author’s analysis of survey data from “Fertility, Family Life and Developmental 
Idealism in Urban Turkey” (2014)
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4.2 Regression analyses 
This study draws on cross-sectional data observing individuals at a single point in 
time. The study sample included currently married men and women with at least 
one child, leading me to use a model that does not censor data. Given that the 
dependent variable (intention for one more child) is binary, I used binary logistic 
regression models to examine the association between gender role attitudes and 
fertility intentions separately among male and female parents. The binary logistic 
regression model estimates the probability that parents intend to have an additional 
child. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent intends to have 
another child and a value of 0 if the respondent does not. Pregnant women are 
excluded from the sample, so the beginning of pregnancy is not considered while 
constructing the dependent variable. Results are expressed as Average Marginal 
Effects (AME); i.e. as the difference in the predicted probability of the variable of 
interest relative to its reference category. As a robustness check, estimations are 
repeated using a linear probability model (LPM), the results of which are presented 
in the appendix.
In line with the fi rst research question of this study, which asks whether there is 
an association between parents’ gender role attitudes and their fertility intentions 
for an additional child in Turkey, the fi rst three models of Table 4 and Table 5 present 
the estimates from the logistic regression models for mothers and fathers. The fi rst 
and second models are bivariate analyses with the gender role attitudes scales 
included in the models in a stepwise manner. The third model includes a combined 
Tab. 3: Descriptive statistics of effects of gender role attitudes on intensions to 
have more children for both male and female parents
Intends to have a or another child
Male parents Female parents
N % N %
GRA-1. Individualism/work orientation
Traditional 100 34.0 141 30.5
Intermediate 116 41.4 219 35.2
Egalitarian 228 33.3 314 26.8
χ 2(2) 2.313 4.326
p-value 0.315 0.115
GRA-2. Family orientation
Traditional 260 35.0 279 28.0
Intermediate 158 36.1 334 32.3
Egalitarian 26 38.5 61 29.5
χ 2(2) 149 1.399
p-value 0.928 0.497
Source: author’s analysis of survey data from “Fertility, Family Life and Developmental 
Idealism in Urban Turkey” (2014)
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model of the two gender role attitudes scales, which cover individualism/work and 
family orientations. 
Examining the gender role attitudes scale on individualism/work orientation 
(GRA-1), the notable results for male interviewees concern the intermediate 
category; intermediate men tend to have a 7.2 percentage point higher likelihood 
of wanting more children than men with traditional values do (p-value = 0.266). 
The results do not reveal an infl uence of egalitarianism on fertility intention, with 
egalitarian men being 0.7 percentage points less likely to intend to have more 
children (p-value = 0.906), with both results statistically nonsignifi cant.
Examining the gender role attitudes scale on family orientation (GRA-2), the 
associations are positive, although they still do not reach statistical signifi cance. 
Intermediate men tend to a have 1.1 percentage point higher likelihood of 
choosing additional childbirth than traditional men do (p-value = .823), while 
egalitarian men are 3.4 percentage points more likely to intend to have more 
children (p-value = 0.725). Similar results were obtained when the two gender role 
attitudes scales were combined in a third model. Neither the separate analyses nor 
the combined model of gender role attitudes for fathers yield substantively and 
statistically signifi cant results. However, caution is advised when interpreting the 
results, since the confi dence intervals preclude any defi nitive conclusions from 
these estimations.
For mothers, being egalitarian seems to be negatively associated with fertility 
intentions in the fi rst gender role attitudes scale in Model 1 (AME = -.038, 
p-value = .410) and Model 3 (AME = -.036, p-value = .438). Intermediate mothers, 
in all three gender role attitude scales (M1-M3), have a 4 percentage point higher 
likelihood of planning for more children than traditional women do. However, none 
of these estimates reach statistical signifi cance. Moreover, the width of confi dence 
intervals for these key variables is notably large and includes zero, suggesting that 
one should be cautious to draw a precise conclusion as to the association between 
gender role attitudes and fertility intentions. 
Overall, the most noticeable result in these estimates is that both egalitarian men 
and women tend to have a lower desire for having more children than the traditional 
parents do. This is an expected fi nding, which is likely linked to the particular issues 
asked of respondents in each gender role attitudes question. I surmise that the items 
related to individualism/work orientation, including single parenting, voluntary 
childlessness, and women’s independence through employment correspond with 
liberal and egalitarian values associated with a modern/western lifestyle. In the 
Turkish context, research shows that late and low fertility is also understood as 
an attribute of a modern family lifestyle considered prevalent in western countries 
(Kavas/Thornton 2019). So, it is likely that people holding egalitarian attitudes may 
not have a positive view of a large family and thus they may have a lower intention 
for continued childbearing. Taken together, while egalitarian parents’ lower desire 
for more children partly supports the outlined expectations, the statistically non-
signifi cant results coupled with the width of confi dence intervals are contrary to 
the study hypothesis predicting a strong association. Nevertheless, even though 
the data do not provide the statistical power to draw any fi rm conclusions, fi ndings 
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suggest slight variations between the categories of gender role attitudes and their 
relations to fertility intentions.
Model 5 estimates the infl uence of the control variables in line with the second 
research question which asks whether the infl uence of gender role attitudes on 
fertility persists once background factors are controlled for. For both men and 
women, the fully controlled model does not yield substantively or statistically 
signifi cant results concerning parents’ gender role attitudes and fertility intentions. 
However, the results highlight the importance of some of the characteristics of 
parents included in these full models (Table 4 and Table 5). For example, fertility 
intention was shown to be associated with respondents’ age for both fathers and 
mothers, with older parents having a lower desire to have more children (men: 
AME = -.022, p-value = 0.000; women: AME = -.016, p-value = .000). Marital 
timing seems to be a predictor of fertility intentions, as parents who delayed 
marriage seem to plan the transition to higher-order birth 1.4 percentage points 
more frequently than early marrying parents do (p-value = .016). Interestingly, this 
association is particularly signifi cant for fathers, which may be because men delay 
marriage more often than women in Turkey (TurkStat 2020). For fathers, the sex 
composition of children appears to be signifi cant; parents who have at least one 
son tend to lower their intention for an additional child and this association seems 
to be strong (AME = .092, p = .042). This observed association is consistent with 
recent work which found that Turkish parents show a strong son preference through 
“son-biased fertility behavior,” and are more likely to discontinue childbearing after 
a male birth (Altındağ 2015). For mothers, as expected, parents with mid-level 
education are 18.4 percentage points less likely to intend for more children than 
parents with lower education (p = .000); in an additional analysis that only controls 
for age, this negative association becomes even stronger, indicating that part of 
the association can be explained with the infl uence of age on respondents’ fertility 
intentions. However, having a high level of education does not seem to have a 
similar infl uence on fertility (AME = .006, p-value = .927), although this surprising 
fi nding may be due to the small sample size for the category (n = 57). Religiosity 
is positively associated with higher fertility for both sexes (men: AME = 107, 
p-value = .023; women: AME = .122, p-value = .012), which is consistent with the 
literature (see Adsera 2006; Philipov/Berghammer 2007 for similar fi ndings). Islam 
has explicit rules related to getting married and having children, with large families 
and multiple children being encouraged. These discourses permeate norms and 
values about family and fertility. Being non-Turk (this predominantly refers to the 
Kurdish population) is associated with higher fertility intentions for both fathers 
and mothers (men: Exp (B) = .135, p-value = .007; women: Exp (B) = .063, 
p-value = .075), although caution is needed when interpreting these results for 
women, as the estimate is imprecise. The association between being non-Turk and 
having a large family is expected, as Kurds on average have a higher total fertility in 
general and the highest third birth risk (Yavuz 2006). 
As expected, the number of children is signifi cantly and negatively correlated 
with a plan to have more children. For both fathers and mothers, compared to 
one-child parents, parents with two children are 22.6 and 23.9 percentage points, 
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respectively, less likely to desire more children (p-value = .000) and parents with 
three and more children are 33.7 and 35.1 percentage points, respectively, less 
likely to plan to continue childbearing (p-value = .000). This result is conceivable 
for Turkish parents, as having a large family with three and more children is not 
very common. Clearly, for Turkish parents, the fi rst child having a sibling is a more 
important determinant for continued fertility than having a larger family, and this 
pattern seems to hold for the study sample (see Miettinen et al. 2011 for an example 
in Finland). 
The third research question of this study is tested in a separate model (Model 
4) where demographic variables are explored independently of the gender role 
attitudes. The results are largely similar to the fully controlled model (Model 5). The 
results in Model 4 further provide some indication that parents’ individual and family 
characteristics such as age, marital timing, education, religiosity, ethnicity, number, 
and the sex composition of children tend to shape parents’ fertility decision-making 
independently of their gender role attitudes. 
As further robustness checks, I ran linear regression models, (i.e., a linear 
probability model) separately for men and women, estimating both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. These estimations yield almost identical results, which 
suggests that the estimates from the logistic models are robust. Tables for the 
robustness checks are presented in the appendix.
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, the relationship between Turkish parents’ gender role attitudes and their 
fertility intentions for an additional child is examined. The empirical expectations 
were drawn from the theoretical contributions of McDonald (2000a/b, 2006), who 
proposed that as societies move from traditional to egalitarian, people’s reproductive 
choices change. The timeframe in which gender equality in the institutional sphere is 
achieved yet societal adaptation to new changes is ongoing is of particular interest, 
with an expectation of fertility decline. In this study, I attempted to investigate this 
relationship using individual-level data and studied Turkey, where changes toward 
gender equality in the public sphere have not been adopted in the private sphere 
with persistent fertility decline accompanying these changes. 
Overall, the fi ndings of this study do not provide strong evidence that Turkish 
parents’ gender role attitudes are associated with their fertility intentions. In 
particular, the results of this study neither support nor contradict the theoretical 
framework by McDonald (2000a/b, 2006) about the nexus between gender equity 
and fertility in the Turkish setting. The results of this study are consistent with a 
previous work by Philipov (2008) who examined gender role-fertility relationships in 
ten European countries and found no relationship between the various dimensions 
of gender roles and intentions to have or not to have a second- or higher-order child. 
The lack of signifi cant fi ndings supporting the expected effects may be related 
to the small sample size used in the regression analyses, moreover, it may also 
be related to measurement issues, a concern which has been raised in previous 
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research (e.g., Arpino et al. 2015; Brinton/Lee 2016; Knight/Brinton 2017; Miettinen 
et al. 2011; Mills 2010; Westoff/Higgins 2009). The questions used to measure 
gender role attitudes are frequently used in other surveys and have been proven to 
be reliable and valid (Davis/Greenstein 2009). However, it might be that these survey 
items measure gender role attitudes broadly, without addressing relevant aspects 
of gender roles in the Turkish setting. Since inequality is particularly evident within 
the family in Turkey, survey items that capture attitudes about gender equality in 
the family sphere could reveal more relevant aspects of gender roles in Turkey than 
those examining the public sphere. These could include questions related to the 
division of housework and care between mothers and fathers. Moreover, questions 
that tap the degree of adherence to the traditional norms about marriage timing, 
divorce, and beliefs regarding “honor” and virginity could unravel a more nuanced 
depiction of attitudes about men’s and women’s roles in family and social life. In this 
sense, using vignettes that introduce cases closely tailored to the study setting, for 
instance, may be a better approach for measuring gender roles and their connection 
to fertility decisions in Turkey.
Moreover, in line with the multidimensionality discussions in the literature (e.g. 
Brinton/Lee 2016; Knight/Brinton 2017; Hudde 2018), constructing a diverse range 
of gender ideology profi les could better measure attitudes regarding gender roles 
in Turkey. For example, in a recent work, Lee and Brinton identifi ed “pro-work 
conservatism,” which prescribes that women participate in the labor market while 
maintaining their primary role in the home. Even though the authors argue that 
pro-work conservatism is prevalent in low-fertility countries such as Japan, South 
Korea, and several societies in Southern and Eastern Europe, I speculate that a 
spectrum of more nuanced gender ideology profi les such as pro-work conservatism 
could refl ect gender relations in Turkey more closely. Importantly, the regression 
analysis suggests that structural factors were more important driving forces of 
Turkish parents’ childbearing plans than their gender role attitudes. The decision to 
have an additional child may not be an easy one for Turkish parents, as the cost of 
childbearing in Turkey is considerable. Most people are concerned about providing 
a decent education, clothing, and food for their children, given Turkey’s economic 
uncertainty. Moreover, the current Turkish welfare system does not reach all strata 
of society and does not meet peoples’ expectations (Grütjen 2008). Therefore, 
under these socio-economic conditions, planning for a larger family requires a very 
careful cost-benefi t calculation. On the other hand, Turkey is a patriarchal society 
with a diverse ethnic population; therefore, the consistent and signifi cant impact of 
ethnicity and son preference on parents’ fertility decision-making is not surprising. 
Finally, the observed effect of religiosity on fertility intention is to be expected, since 
the conservative Muslim community in Turkey – especially the recent government’s 
discourses and policy efforts to return to the traditional family – certainly infl uence 
in Turkey today (Kaya 2015; Yazıcı 2012).
This study has a number of limitations. The most relevant one is that the data 
come from a sample of urban residents rather than a nationally representative 
sample. This limits the generalizability of the study’s results to the entire country. 
To the extent that attitudes to gender roles are different in rural and urban contexts, 
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the sample results would diverge from national results. However, I argue that the 
rapid urbanization in recent decades and currently the substantial rural elements in 
urban centres may mediate these limitations to some extent. 
Another limitation is that the data used for this study is restricted to currently 
married parents at parity 1, 2, 3 and above, aged between 18 and 49. While this data 
restriction is based on the research question, a larger sample including people with 
different parental and marital status could yield different results. 
A third limitation is that the study had to omit variables such as respondents’ 
income and childcare arrangements. Living in a society with persistent economic 
insecurity and a high rate of unemployment, individuals with low income and 
precarious job conditions will likely prefer lower fertility than individuals without 
these diffi culties. Also, it would have been useful to include the childcare 
arrangement as a predictor; it is likely that a lack of affordable and quality public 
childcare provision for the employed population forces parents to limit their fertility, 
particularly when they don’t have strong support networks (such as grandparents 
and other relatives), as is the case with most employed parents in Turkey.
Finally, data for this study was collected from the respondents but not their 
spouses, which restricts the empirical analysis in two ways. First, as previous 
research has found, fertility decisions are usually taken at the couple level; for 
example, when there is no consensus regarding fertility decisions, the likelihood 
of having a or another child decreases (e.g. Thomson/Hoem 1998). Second, 
discrepant gender role attitudes between partners may infl uence fertility decisions 
(Aassve et al. 2014; Arpino et al. 2015; Hudde/Engelhart 2020). For example, similar 
or discordant gender role attitudes between partners may lower the risk of the 
transition to parenthood (Hudde/Engelhart 2020) as well as having a second child 
(Aassve et al. 2014). Future research should expand on the link between gender 
relations and fertility intentions by considering couple-level dynamics and their 
gender-related attitudinal characteristics. 
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